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The Supreme Court, The Depression,
and The New Deal: 1930-1941*
Hon. J. Lee Rankin**
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Swisher has propounded the general principle that
much of the strength of the Supreme Court during the early period
of our nation's history lay in its refusal to deal with abstractions
and advisory opinions, and its avowal to decide a case or contro-
versy directly within the context of an adversary proceeding; in
its refusal to speak in the name of politics, and its avowal to speak
only in the name of the law.1 These fundamental guidelines may
also serve as a basic context within which an analysis of the
Supreme Court and its role during the depression and the New
Deal may be placed. This basic context of our analysis of the de-
pression and New Deal Court necessarily requires, as an initial
matter, a consideration of the responsibilities and function of the
Supreme Court in our system of government, and consideration of
some of our fundamental rules of constitutional law and of the
reasoning processes by which the Justices have arrived at their
decisions.
II. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
It was Chief Justice Marshall who declared, in the famous
case of Marbury v. Madison,2 that the Court had the power to de-
clare void a legislative act which conflicted with the Constitution.
The debates at the Constitutional Convention offer evidence that
* Presented at the Institute for Public Affairs, University of Omaha,
Omaha, Nebraska, April 6, 1960.
** A.B., 1928, LL.B., 1930, University of Nebraska. Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States, 1953-1956; Solicitor General of the United
States since 1956.
I See Swisher, The United States Supreme Court and the Forging of
Federalism: 1789-1864, 40 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1960). Professor Swisher
also portrayed how, during times of crisis, when the Court, as in Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), and Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), has not followed this general principle, near
disaster followed. See Swisher, supra.
2 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally POWELL, VAGARIES AND
VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1956).
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the Court, as a court of law, was expected to nullify legislation only
as a judicial function-by deciding a case or controversy by means
of a reasoned written opinion. The Virginia Plan which proposed
that the veto power be vested in a Council of Revision composed
of the Executive and Judiciary was rejected at the Convention in
favor of the plan vesting veto power in the President alone. The
reason assigned was that such a Council of Revision allowed the
Justices a double chance to veto an act of Congress, once on the
ground of policy in their non-judicial capacity within the Council,
and a second time on the ground of unconstitutionality when the
act came before the Court in an adversary proceeding.
3
Even within its judicial function, however, the Court was ex-
pected to declare legislation unconstitutional only within careful
and narrowly prescribed limits. The judge was expected not to
enlarge his authority or attempt to "legislate," for legislative power
required initiative and experimentation generated by the political
processes and exercised only by those elected by the citizenry and
subject to replacement when unresponsive to the will of the elec-
torate. Thus constitutional questions were not even to be deter-
mined unless the case before the Court could not be decided on any
other ground; and when in fact a rule of constitutional law was
formulated, it was not to be formulated in broader terms than re-
quired by the precise facts of the case to which the rule was to
apply.4
In all circumstances the judiciary was to exercise self-restraint
because', as Chancellor Waties maintained, ". . the interference
of the judicial power with legislative acts, if frequent or on dubi-
ous grounds, might occasion so great a jealousy of this power, and
so general a prejudice against it, as to lead to measures which
might end in the total overthrow of the independence of the judici-
ary, and with it this best preservation of the Constitution."5 Be-
cause of such admonitions of caution, Chief Justice Marshall, in the
3 See 1 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 73, 76, 80, 97, 98 (1st ed. 1911); WARREN, THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 187 (1928).
4 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) ,Brandeis, J., con-
curring).
5 Administrators of Byrne v. Administrators of Stewart, 20 S.C. (3 Desaus.
Eq.) 466, 476-77 (1812), quoted in Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 142
(1893). [The quotation in the text is taken from the Byrne case.-Ed.].
See also COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 216 (6th ed.
1890).
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case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,6 elaborated on the doc-
trine of constitutionality he first propounded in the Marbury case,
"that in no doubtful case, would it [the court] pronounce a legis-
lative act to be contrary to the constitution. ' 7 In all instances, the
range of choice was to be left open to the legislature, and not the
Court. The standard of duty of the Court in its consideration of
legislative enactments was expressed with clarity by James Brad-
ley Thayer in October 1893:
It [the Court] can only disregard the Act when those who have
the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have
made a very clear one,-so clear that it is not open to rational ques-
tion. That is the standard of duty to which the courts bring legis-
lative Acts; that is the test which they apply,-not merely their
own judgment as to constitutionality, but their conclusion as to
what judgment is permissible to another department which the
Constitution has charged with the duty of making it.8
Chief Justice Marshall further developed his doctrine of judicial
self restraint as to legislative enactments when he maintained that:
the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the na-
tional legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by
which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which
will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in
the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the consti-
tution, are constitutional.9
The duty then of the judiciary is to fix the outside boundary
for legislative enactments as limited by the Constitution, the boun-
dary being a limitation of power, not wisdom. The legislature as
so limited is then free to range and select a myriad of possibilities
to meet the specific needs. In such a process, the judicial branch
must attribute to the legislative branch virtue, sense and com-
petent knowledge, as it must do in dealing with an equal and co-
6 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
7 Id. at 625. See also Hylton V. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175
(1796); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 395 (1798).
8 Thayer, supra note 5, at 144. Thayer illustrates his position by citing
Cooley ".... to the effect that one who is a member of a legislature may
vote against a measure as being, in his judgment, unconstitutional; and,
being subsequently placed on the bench, when this measure, having been
passed by the legislature in spite of his opposition, comes before himjudicially, may there find it his duty, although he has in no degree
changed his opinion, to declare it constitutional." Ibid.
9 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 40, 1960
ordinate organ of government. The same principles apply in con-
struing a state legislative Act except within the sphere belonging
to the national government, where the Supremacy Clause of the
Federal Constitution operates. There, the power of the Nation in
its fullness must be maintained against the States. Thus, along
with the power to pass laws of great merit and benefit to the com-
munity legislatures also have an equal right to enact laws that,
though within constitutional limits, are foolish, unwise, harmful
and even damaging to our vital interests. In these cases, the remedy
lies not in having the statutes declared unconstitutional but in the
ballot box.
The doctrine of self-restraint, however, was never considered by
Marshall to limit Judges by the "original understanding" of what
the Constitution was thought to mean under the conditions pre-
vailing when it was adopted. Constitutions cannot enumerate in
detail all the means which may be used in exercising granted pow-
ers, for this "would partake of the prolixity of a legal code." 10 Con-
stitutions must grow to be able to adjust to changing times and con-
ditions. Otherwise there is a crystallization of the philosophy of
earlier times-a tendency of the law which should be resisted, es-
pecially in the field of constitutional law with its much wider limit-
ing effect.1 Thus it was that Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed
his historic and repeatedly quoted statement: [W]e should never
forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.' 1 2 Marshall con-
tinued:
... The subject is the execution of those great powers on which
the welfare of a nation essentially depends. It must have been the
intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, so far as
human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This
could not be done, by confiding the choice of means to such narrow
limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any
which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end.
This provision is made in a constitution, intended to endure for
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which govern-
ment should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have
been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give
it the properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise
attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if
foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best
provided for as they occur. To have declared, that the best means
shall not be used, but those alone, without which the power given
10 Id. at 407.
11 See Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought, 30 HARV.
L. REV. 201, 210 (1917).
12 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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would be nugatory, would have been to deprive the legislature of
the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and
to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.1 3
It is true, of course, that stare decisis, the doctrine of precedents,
has a bearing in the area of constitutional law as in other areas of
the law, but there is a very real difference in constitutional law,
since the Court's opinion on the construction of the Constitution
"is always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been
founded in error,"'1 4 for as Mr. Justice Field stated: "It is more im-
portant that the Court should be right upon later and more elabor-
ate consideration of the cases than consistent with previous declara-
tions. Those doctrines only will eventually stand which bear the
strictest examination and the test of experience."'15 Especially in
constitutional law, in the interest of society, an erroneous precedent
should not be allowed to control governmental action beyond the
date of discovery of that error.
This principle was followed by Mr. Justice Holmes who appre-
ciated that the Constitution is "the means of ordering the life of a
people."' 6 "General propositions do not decide concrete cases ,'
17
he maintained. The repetition of a catchword can avoid analysis
for many years, with proportionate injury to the interests of so-
ciety. He was suspicious of labels as solutions of knotty questions
and urged that principles are rarely absolute although they always
seek to establish themselves as absolute. He noted an obligation of
the judiciary to allow the future to develop to the fullest extent
to which it might be capable without interference, for he knew so
well that judges are human and have prejudices which they share
with their fellow-men.
Like Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis also used, as his
common working tool, intellectual humility. He believed that the
courts were required to give moral leadership. In accordance with
this belief no statement more fully describes his approach to the
judicial function than that made about his work, that justice "has
been given concrete expression in a long effort towards making the
13 Id. at 415.
14 The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C. J.,
dissenting).
15 Barden v. Northern Pac. R.R., 154 U.S. 288, 322 (1894).
16 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution, 41 HARV. L. REV.
121, 131 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter on Holmes].
17 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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life of the commonplace individual more significant."", Such ef-
forts left him neither the time nor the inclination for a rigid phi-
losophy.
In the judicial tradition the Court has to meet two demands.
One is the requirement that the case be decided, and as soon as
possible. The other is that the judges give written opinions, that
is, reasoned statements of the basis of their decision. The fewness
of the Justices help them to work together and Congress should be
given credit along with the judicial tradition for keeping their
numbers down. There is a resulting pooling of able, diverse and
powerful minds in a common effort. The aim is persuasion, and not
compromise on the level of the least common denominator. All of
the justices who throughout the history of the Court helped to de-
velop and apply Marshall's philosophy of the nature of the judicial
process did it case by case as an evolving doctrine. They sought
objective rather than subjective standards to help them decide.
They tried to restrain their predelictions and use the judicial process
as a pragmatic tool. Some were more successful than others. The
wisest recognized, however, that, "like all human institutions, the
Supreme Court must earn reverence through the test of truth."',,
III. THE SITUATION PRIOR TO THE NEW DEAL-1930-193220
The major issues before the Court during the decade of the
thirties deeply involved those fundamental principles and rules of
constitutional law developed during the days of Marshall. Time and
again, there was called into question the constitutionality of legis-
lative enactments which concerned the economic welfare of the
18 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 33, 105 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter on Brandeis].
19 Frankfurter on Holmes, supra note 16, at 164.
20 Section III is based on the following sources: 2 MORISON & COM-
MAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC cc. XXII-
XXV (4th ed. 1950); SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DE-
VELOPMENT cc. 33-36 (2d ed. 1954). For sources strongly favoring
the New Deal, see ROOSEVELT, THIS I REMEMBER (1949);
1-2 SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE CRISIS OF THE
OLD ORDER, 1919-1933 (1957), THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL
(i959); SHERWOOD, ROOSEVELT AND HOPKINS (rev. ed. 1950). For
the position that the economy would have recovered sooner without
regimentation, see McGEE, HERBERT HOOVER (1959). For the thesis
that World War II, and not the New Deal, brought prosperity, see
MITCHELL, DEPRESSION DECADE, FROM NEW ERA THROUGH
NEW DEAL, 1921-1941, (9 ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES) (1947).
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community and the civil and political rights and liberties of the
individual. Powerful forces contested before the Court; social ten-
sions threatened to wreak havoc and grievous injury to the whole
social structure; contentions became so bitter and threats so danger-
ous that the country almost seemed to pause audibly for the deci-
sion of a crucial issue. The situation became so desperate that se-
rious doubt arose as to whether indeed the Constitution, in
Marshall's phrase, could "endure for ages to come, and consequently
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."
Even prior to the stock market crash in 1929, the economic situ-
ation had become serious. War debts remained uncollectible; foreign
trade had declined drastically; the interest on vast sums in private
investments was in default. Throughout the decade of the twenties,
there was constant unemployment. Consumer purchasing power
had declined, and such old industries as coal and textiles had suf-
fered displacement because of the technological developments in
the production of competing products. Approximately one-third of
the national wealth was tied up in public and private indebtedness,
with installment buying, speculation and other debts having put a
severe strain upon credit resources. Great numbers of citizens were
living either on the margin of existence, or even on mere hopes for
the future.
When the crash finally came in October 1929, stocks suffered
an average decline of forty per cent in less than a month. The col-
lapse caught people unprepared. Millions lost their savings; thou-
sands were forced into bankruptcy. The crash in itself, however,
would not have precluded a recovery if it had not been accompanied
by mounting debts, reduced purchases and a general demoralization
of price structures.
Substantial numbers of employees were dismissed, while those
who were retained had wages and salaries slashed. By 1933, the
unemployed were variously estimated from twelve to fifteen mil-
lions. Many competent persons could not find employment even as
common labor. Sheltering and feeding the unemployed appeared
to be an immeasurable responsibility and one that could not be ad-
equately met.
The farmers had suffered large losses in income in an earlier
period and their dire need was further aggravated by the crash.
They could not pay their debts and their mortgages were being
foreclosed to such an extent that substantial areas of farm lands
either had or were passing into the hands of the lenders. The new
owners often had difficulty in finding anyone willing to operate
the properties under the conditions then prevailing. Real estate
had lost much of its value and tax collections had dropped to such
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a degree that many units of government were threatened with
bankruptcy.
Foreign trade was cut to a third of what it had been. The whole
national income fell from an estimated eighty-five billion dollars
in 1929 to an approximate thirty-seven billion in 1932. By March
1933, two-thirds of the banks of the country had been closed by
official proclamation shaking the economy to its foundation.
The problem of existence had become grave for vast numbers
of society. Even those with the strongest positions in the economy
were threatened by the violence of the financial holocaust. Thus,
the entire country clamored for affirmative, forceful action, and
turned to the government as the last hope for salvation. Largely
through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Federal Farm
Board and direct aid for those made destitute by the drought of
1930, assistance in some measure was given prior to 1932. By the
latter date, as evidenced by the election of Franklin Roosevelt to
the Presidency, the demand was overwhelming for a program by
the government to restore the economy of the country. And so the
New Deal was born.
It is difficult to appraise the New Deal era even now, because
the feelings and passions which were engendered during that period
have not permitted sufficient time for an adequate evaluation and
perspective. The greater number of historians, however, now con-
clude that the New Deal was more an evolution than a revolution.
Despite the rapid changes which took place during that period be-
cause of the imperative need for speed in the emergency situation,
the historians point out that the modification of the laissez-faire
economy and the development of social controls had proceeded
steadily from the middle eighties to the Wilson Administration, and
had merely been held in abeyance by the World War and the post-
war development.2 1 Thus, as far back as 1880 there had been federal
regulation of businesses and the railroads; in the more progressive
states of Massachusetts, New York, Wisconsin, Oregon, and Kansas
there had been social legislation at an early date. Furthermore,
American industry and business had long accepted such practices
as price-fixing agreements, codes and cartels, and the regimentation
of labor in company-owned towns and company unions. In addition,
the historians agree that a "new deal" in some form was inevitable
because the economic conditions were certain to produce some
such solution. They all disagree, however, as to the measure of
21 On basic changes in the economy that will form a cushion to reduce
effects of another depression, see ALLEN, THE BIG CHANGE (1952);
GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH, 1929 (1955).
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effectiveness of the New Deal, but recognize that one of its chief
virtues was its persistence in daring to try to find requisite solu-
tions.
IV. MEMBERS OF THE COURT AT THE BEGINNING
OF THE NEW DEAL
This then was the state of affairs in our country when the
New Deal was inaugurated. Soon the Court was to become the
battle ground in the struggle for economic and social welfare and
individual civil rights and liberties.
For the most part, the composition of the Court was comparable
to that of the Court from its earliest days. 22 All members had been
lawyers with successful careers. All were experienced in politics.
A number had had important positions in the government, and
several had been on the bench before coming to the Court.
Of those generally called conservative, Van Devanter of Indi-
ana was the oldest at seventy-seven. Prior to his coming to the
Court in 1910 as a Taft appointment, he had been appointed by Theo-
dore Roosevelt to the Federal Circuit Court in 1903, and had pre-
viously been a member of the Territorial Legislature and Chief
Justice of the State Supreme Court in Wyoming, as well as a prac-
ticing lawyer.
22 For short biographies of the Justices, on which much of the material in
section IV is based, see 1 FREUND, SUTHERLAND, HOWE & BROWN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, cc. XXXVI-XLIX, (1954). The following is
a list of the Justices on the Court from 1930-1941, initials for their
designation, their periods on the bench, and the Justices whom they
succeeded:
Holmes (Ho) (1902-32)
Van Devanter (V) (1910-37)
McReynolds (Mc) (1914-41)
Brandeis (Br) (1916-39)
Sutherland (Su) (1922-38)
Butler (Bu) (1922-39)
Stone (St) 1925-41)
Hughes, C. J. (Hu) (1930-41)
Roberts (Ro) (1930-45)
Cardozo (C) (1932-39), succeeded Holmes
Black (B1) (1937-), succeeded Van Devanter
Reed (Re) (1938-57), succeeded Sutherland
Frankfurter (F) (1939-), succeeded Cardozo
Douglas (D) (1939-), succeeded Brandeis
Murphy (M) (1940-49), succeeded Butler
Byrnes (By) (1941-42), succeeded McReynolds
Jackson (J) (1941-54), succeeded Stone
Stone, C. J. (St) (1941-46), succeeded Hughes.
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McReynolds from Tennessee was seventy-four. Prior to his ap-
pointment to the Court by Wilson in 1914, he had been a professor
of law at Vanderbilt as well as a practitioner in New York, and had
served as a member of Congress, as Assistant Attorney General,
when he prosecuted the tobacco trust, and as Attorney General
under Wilson.
Sutherland, the most skillful of the conservatives, was also
seventy-four. In Utah, he served as a member of the State Legisla-
ture and later proceeded to Washington as Congressman and then
Senator. In 1918, he was President of the American Bar Associa-
tion, and in 1922, when he failed of re-election to the Senate,
Harding appointed him to the Court.
Butler, a seventy-year old Irish-Catholic from Minnesota, had
been a very successful railroad lawyer. Harding had appointed him
to the Court in 1922, over vigorous opposition from Senator Norris.
Roberts, a Philadelphia lawyer, was the youngest at sixty-one.
He had been professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania, an
assistant district attorney in Philadelphia, and had prosecuted the
oil cases. In 1930, Coolidge appointed him to the Court after the
nomination of Judge Parker had been rejected by the Senate.
Chief Justice Hughes, seventy-four, had been appointed as
Chief Justice by Hoover in 1930. He had previously been Governor
of New York, after having conducted a great and most successful
investigation of fraudulent insurance companies, a Taft-appointed
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, an unsuccessful presidential
candidate against Wilson in 1916, Harding's and then Coolidge's
Secretary of State, and President of the American Bar Association
in 1924-25.23
Brandeis, whose confirmation to the Court in 1916 had been
over fierce opposition by many members of the bar, including Root,
Taft and five other past presidents of the American Bar Association,
was the oldest member of the Court at eighty. He had been an active
and successful practicing lawyer in Boston, the father of savings
bank insurance, the originator of the factual brief and the People's
Advocate.24
Stone, sixty-four, appointed to the Court by Coolidge in 1925,
had been Coolidge's Attorney General in 1924. Before coming to
Washington, he had been Dean of Columbia Law School for about
23 For a detailed chronicle see the two-volume Pulitzer Prize biography,
PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (1951).
24 See generally MASON, BRANDEIS, A FREE MAN'S LIFE (1946) [here-
inafter cited as MASON ON BRANDEIS].
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thirteen years, and a member of the New York firm of Sullivan and
Cromwell.25
Cardozo, sixty-six, was also a New Yorker. He had been a
judge in the lower courts of New York and then from 1914 a judge
of its highest court, the Court of Appeals, becoming Chief Judge of
that court in 1927. In 1932 he was appointed to the Supreme Court
by Hoover on the urging of Senators Norris and Borah that he was
the Country's most distinguished judge and jurist.2 6
In general, the Justices on the Court were in agreement on the
basic principles of constitutional adjudication which had been form-
ulated by Marshall. As for the application of those principles, how-
ever, that was another matter; the vital issue was just where, pre-
cisely, the line of application of those principles was to be drawn.
And it was this general issue which created the deep schism on
the Court, dividing the Court between Van Devanter, McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Butler, on one side, and Brandeis, Stone, and Car-
dozo on the other, with Hughes mostly siding with the latter three
and Roberts as the swing man, now moving to one side and then
to the other to help constitute the uneasy majority.
V. THE OLD COURT AND THE NEW DEAL
During the first two years of the New Deal, few signs of the
impending Court Crisis were obvious. Indeed, there seemed to be
every indication that the Court would sustain the New Deal legisla-
tion. In January 1934, the Court, in the Blaisdell case,27 upheld the
Minnesota moratorium on mortgage foreclosures as consonant with
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Later that
same year, the Court in the Nebbia case,28 similarly approved the
New York Price Fixing Law, thereby recognizing the right of a
State to control prices. The coming struggle within the Court, and
the prophesy of the deep schism to come, was already apparent,
25 See generally MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE
LAW (1956) [hereinafter cited as MASON ON STONE], critically re-
viewed by Kurland, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1318 (1957); Westin, Book Re-
view, 66 YALE L. J. 462 (1957).
26 See generally HELLMAN, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, AMERICAN
JUDGE (1940); Mr. Justice Cardozo, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 52 HARV.
L. REV. 353,48 YALE L. J. 371 (1939).
27 Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
28 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Mason credits Stone's dissent-
ing opinion with the doctrine in this case. See MASON ON STONE, op.
cit. supra note 25, at 365-367.
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however, 29 for both Blaisdell and Nebbia had been sustained by a
five to four vote, Chief Justice Hughes, the author of Blaisdell, and
Mr. Justice Roberts, the author of Nebbia, siding with Brandeis,
Stone and Cardozo. The minority spoke out for the preservation of
the laissez-faire economy; and it was no doubt natural that they
should, for each had been successful under it and suspicious of
any sub*stitute. They hoped for recovery by the natural process of
supply and demand which would relieve the economic situation and
avoid any change in the economic structure.
The threat to the New Deal became apparent the next year. In
what became known as the "hot oil" case °3 0 the first New Deal
legislation to come before the Court-a section of the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act-was declared void by an eight to one opin-
ion because of an unconstitutional delegation by Congress of the
power to legislate. Only Mr. Justice Cardozo dissented. One fac-
tor which no doubt led at least Justices Stone and Brandeis to join
in the opinion was the failure of the government even to publish
or authenticate the Executive Order involved in the case, the viola-
tion of which had been made a crime.31 Nevertheless, the basis for
voiding the statute shocked the administration. The practice of
delegation had been followed and recognized from colonial days.
How could the government conduct its affairs without a large
measure of authority to delegate power? If the limited power of
the President to prohibit shipments of "hot oil" was considered un-
constitutional, what would be the effect of that decision on the
President's more general authority under the Recovery Act to ap-
prove codes of fair competition for various unspecified industries?
Was the legislative statement of policy in the Act sufficiently defi-
nite to prevent the exercise on the President's part of free, un-
trammeled discretion under the broad powers of administrative
rule-making delegated to him so that the rest of the act would be
upheld as constitutional? These questions soon were to be answered.
In the Schechter Poultry case,32 involving the validity of the
29 See JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 82-83
(1941).
30 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
31 MASON ON STONE, op. cit. supra note 25, at 387-88. For the explanation
of the error in drafting the executive order and the subsequent changes
in publication procedures see JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 29, at 89-91.
See also Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-
1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 656-58 (1946).
32 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See
Powell, Commerce, Pensions, and Codes, II, 49 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1935).
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code regulating the shipment of dressed poultry in interstate com-
merce, the Court was not even satisfied to hold the delegation of
power unconstitutional, as could have been anticipated from the
"hot oil" case, but went on to declare unanimously that the
National Industrial Recovery Act was beyond the power of Con-
gress to enact under the commerce clause, because the intrastate
transactions involved in the case had only an indirect effect on
interstate commerce33 and were thus within the domain of state
power guaranteed under the Tenth Amendment. The decision
raised again the issue of the distribution of power between the
states and national government, and revived the concept of Dual
Federalism, originally developed by Madison,34 which was to come
back to haunt the Court in the years to come. It was bad enough
that the Court felt compelled to reach the constitutional question
of delegation of power. But having decided that issue previously
in the "hot oil" case, the Court reinforced its "violation" of one
of its basic tenets by reaching the second constitutional question
of the extent of Congress' power under the commerce clause, in-
stead of allowing the case to be decided on the other ground. The
decision caused great consternation as to the limits of Congress'
powers which the Court would allow Congress to exercise. But
even more far reaching was the effect of the decision in the lower
federal courts. Single federal trial judges thereafter proceeded
to grant hundreds of injunctions to restrain officers of the federal
government from carrying out the acts of Congress. Fortunately,
in 1937, this practice was halted by the statute requiring a three-
judge court to pass upon applications for such injunctions. 35
In the Carter Coal case,'36 the Supreme Court in a six to three
decision once again struck down an act of Congress-this time the
Guffey Coal Control Act, which provided for a code of fair com-
petition for the coal industry-on the ground that Congress had
unconstitutionally delegated its power to the producers and miners
in the industry to fix maximum hours of labor and minimum wages.
33 For a discussion of the various theories of commerce in the case, see
CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 119-20 (1947).
34 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (Madison). It was Madison's contention that
the Commerce Clause was not a grant of power "to be used for the
positive purposes of the general government." 4 LETTERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 14-15. See CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION,
LTD. 19, 50-51 (1941); CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME
COURT c. 2 (1934).
35 Judiciary Act of 1937, § 3, c. 754, 50 Stat. 752 (now 28 U.S.C. § 2282
(1958)).
36 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 40, 1960
In contrast to the misdemeanor provisions of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, the provisions of the Guffey Act provided for an
excise tax on the sale price of coal unless the producer accepted
the code and acted in compliance with the Act. The Court, relying
on Schechter, further declared that the Act was beyond the power
of Congress under the Commerce Clause. Then the Court turned
to certain price-fixing provisions for coal under the Act, and
declared that they were invalid because they were inseparable
from the rest of the Act despite the fact that Congress had specifical-
ly declared the various provisions of the Act separable, the
separate provisions for prices and wages to go into effect at dif-
ferent times and to" be regulated by different bodies. Chief Justice
Hughes in his concurrence and Mr. Justice Cardozo in his dissent,
insisted that the provisions of the act were separable. In 1940, the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1937 was upheld by the new
Court on grounds advanced by Chief Justice Hughes and Mr.
Justice Cardozo in Carter Coal.3 T
In the meantime the Court was striking down legislation in
other areas. In 1934, the Court, with Mr. Justice Roberts as the
swing-man and author, invalidated by a vote of five to four the
Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 which had established a uniform
and compulsory system of pensions for all railroad workers on
interstate lines. 38 The Court not only found that the Act placed
an arbitrary burden on the railroads and thereby took away the
railroads' property without due process of law, but it also once
again decided to reach a second constitutional question by declar-
ing that Congress had no power under the Commerce Clause to
provide for the social welfare of the worker on the grounds that
by engendering contentment and a sense of personal security the
workers will provide more efficient service. Chief Justice Hughes
in the dissent contended that the legislation was supported by the
fundamental consideration "that industry should take care of its
human wastage, whether that is due to accident or age." Thus
the issue was drawn on whether Congress had the power under
the Commerce Clause to pass social legislation. The pronouncement
of the majority-so unnecessary to the decision-was in effect
an advisory opinion and raised serious question as to whether the
Court was not speaking in the name of politics rather than in the
name of the law, and fixing the outer boundary for legislative enact-
37 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
38 Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). See Powell,
supra note 32.
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ments by the criterion of wisdom, rather than by the criterion of
legislative power.
On the same day that the Court invalidated the National
Industrial Recovery Act, the Court, either unaware of the storm
brewing or hoping that it would blow over, had also proceeded
to hold the Frazier-Lemke Act of 1934 invalid,39 and the removal
by the President of a member of an independent agency without
cause as being in excess of the Executive power. 40 Later in that
year, the Court held the Federal Home Owners' Loan Act of 1935
permitting the conversion of state saving and loan associations into
federal associations without State approval to be unconstitutional
as an encroachment upon the reserved powers of the States;
41
declared a Vermont Income and Franchise Tax Act which taxed
money at a higher rate when loaned outside the State than when
loaned within it, to be invalid on the ground that it was a denial of
equal protection and an abridgment of the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States, 42 and also invalidated the Municipal
Bankruptcy Act.43
In 1936, the validity of the Agricultural Adjustment Act came
before the Court. This legislation provided for parity payments
on certain crops grown on limited acreage. The payments were
to be obtained from the consumer but collected from the processor
as a tax. The Court, by a vote of six to three, in an opinion written
by Mr. Justice Roberts, held the Act unconstitutional on the theory
it was not really a tax but coerced crop regulation by economic
pressure since the Act required the farmer to reduce acreage to
get his payment. Since such regulation was a power reserved to
the states, Congress could not indirectly accomplish its ends by
the tax power.44
Mr. Justice Stone, joined by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo,
dissented, proclaiming that the Court's proper interest should be
only in Congress' power to enact statutes, not in the wisdom of the
legislation, and that although the exercise of power by the executive
and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial
restraint, the only check on the Court's exercise of power was its
39 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
40 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
41 Hopkins Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935).
42 Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
43 Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513
(1936).
44 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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own sense of self-restraint. Unwise statutes could be removed
by the ballot. Thus, the possibility of abuse of the spending power
was no justification for curtailing it. The only limits on the taxing
power, averred Mr. Justice Stone, are that the purpose be truly
national, that the power not be used to coerce action left to state
control, and that the exercise of the power be consonant with the
conscience and patriotism of the Congress and Executive.
The majority had apparently forgotten Mr. Justice Holmes'
dictum that "legislators are ultimate guardians of the liberties
and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts."45
Soon thereafter Congress promptly passed a Soil Conservation Act,
and in 1938, when it passed another Agricultural Adjustment Act,
the Act was upheld on the basis of the Commerce Clause rather
than the taxing power by a new Court with Justices Black, Reed,
Frankfurter and Douglas having replaced Justices Van Devanter,
Sutherland, Cardozo and Brandeis. 46
During the first three years of the New Deal, the only major
respite which the Court allowed in its ceaseless invalidation of New
Deal legislation was in the "gold clause" cases 47 and in Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority.48 In the "gold clause" cases, the
Court held that such a clause, which required the payment of con-
tractual claims in gold rather than paper money, was unenforce-
able in a private contract because otherwise the clause would
interfere with the power of the Congress to control the fiscal policy
of the country. When such a clause was present in a government
contract, however, in this case a bond, the obligation was binding,
but unenforceable because actual damages could not be proved.
By so holding, the Court, as Charles P. Curtis, Jr., said, mixed
bad constitutional vinegar with good legal olive oil,49 or as Mr.
Justice Stone maintained in his separate concurring opinion, it
was "unnecessary" and "undesirable for the Court to undertake
to say that the obligation of the gold clause in government bonds
is greater than in the bonds of private individuals," since the issue
could have been decided solely on the ground that no damage had
been shown. Though the cases were thus decided in favor of the
government's power, they clearly indicated the precarious nature
47 Missouri, Kan., & Tex. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
46 Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939).
47 Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240; Nortz v. United States, 294
U.S. 317; Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). See Hart, The
Gold Clause in United States Bonds, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1935)..
48 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
49 CURTIS, op. cit. supra note 33, at 100.
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of the Court's undertaking to pass continually on the constitu-
tionality of a legislative act. Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out the
danger of the Court exercising its power in such grave economic
circumstances and cited the difficulty Europeans had to understand
the role of the 'Court in these cases and in their amazement that
monetary and economic policy could seriously have been thought
to be abld to be controlled by such gold clauses.50
In Ashwander, the Tennessee Valley Authority's right to ac-
quire electric transmission lines for power was upheld by an eight
to one decision, but Mr. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion,
joined by Justices Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo, maintained that
the constitutional question of whether the Wilson Dam and its
power plant were constructed on the Tennessee River in the exer-
cise of the constitutional function of Congress under the Commerce
Clause should not have been reached because the plaintiffs, who
were not stockholders of the company selling the transmission lines,
had no standing to sue. Thus even in the cases in which the power
of Congress to legislate was upheld, the Court went beyond what
was necessary and decided constitutional questions.
The Court's failure to exercise self-restraint, and its frequent
and dubious interference with legislative acts was beginning to
generate, in Chancellor Waties' words, "a prejudice against it, as
to lead to measures which might end in the total overthrow of the
independence: of the judiciary, and with it this best preservation
of the Constitution. "51 The pattern of that development may best
be viewed by a review of the Court's decisions in the area of
maximum hours and minimum wages.
The issue of the power of a legislature to enact laws regulating
maximum hours and minimum wages first came before the Court
as early as 1905 in the now famous Lochner case.52 The Court by
a five to four vote held the New York statute fixing minimum
hours for bakers :unconstitutional as an interference with the
liberty of contract, thus depriving the parties of their liberty
without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in one of the great dissents in our Constitu-
tional history, urged that the Court had no right to impose its
economic theory on the country. He pointed to the fact that over
the years the Court had decided that the States, by such means
as the Sunday laws, the school and postal laws, usury laws and the
50 JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 29, at 103-04.
5,1 See note.5 supra, and accompanying text.
52 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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prohibition of lotteries, may regulate life in many ways which
interfere with the freedom of contract and which, therefore, the
Justices if legislators might not approve. Since a constitution is
made for a people of fundamentally differing views, "the word
liberty in the fourteenth Amendment is perverted When it is held
to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it
can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit
that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles
as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and
our law. '53
In 1923, the Supreme Court shifted its attention from maximum
hours to minimum wages, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital54 in
which the minimum wage statute of the District of Columbia was
brought into question. The majority held the act invalid on the
ground that the payment was exacted from the employer on a
basis having no causal connection with his business or the contract
or the work which the employee had engaged to do.
Twice during the next twelve years, once in 1925 and again
in 1926, the Supreme Court, citing Adkins, invalidated acts which
simply fixed a minimum wage for women-one, an Arizona statute
forbidding the employment of females in certain occupations at a
weekly wage of less than sixteen dollars, the other, an Arkansas
statute declaring it unlawful to pay female employees with six
months' experience less than one dollar and a quarter per day,
and inexperienced females less than one dollar a day.55
Then in 1936, the Supreme Court by a five to four decision in
the Tipaldo case56 declared the New York Minimum Wage Law for
Women to be unconstitutional. The New York Court of Appeals
had held the act invalid on the basis of Adkins. Before the Court,
New York sought to distinguish Tipaldo from Adkins, but did not
urge the Court to overrule Adkins. Apparently, Mr. Justice Roberts
by this time was beginning to have doubts about the trend of the
Court's decisions and, although he could find no basis to dis-
53 Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Apparently Lochner v. New York
was to be confined to its facts since, three years later, a ten-hour law
for women in Oregon was held valid, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908), and, in 1917, time-and-a-half for overtime beyond ten hours
was upheld, Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
54 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
55 Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925); Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg.
Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927). See also Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,
298 U.S. 587, 617, n.4 (1936).
56 Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
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tinguish Adkins from Tipaldo, was willing to go on to overrule
Adkins. Since Chief Justice Hughes was not willing to overrule
Adkins, however, but wanted to distinguish it instead in a separate
opinion along lines which New York had suggested, Mr. Justice
Roberts decided to vote with the majority on the narrow ground
that since New York had not asked to have Adkins overruled, the
majority would not reach that question.57 Since then the New York
Court of Appeals could find no material difference between the
New York statute and the one involved in Adkins, the majority
of the Court held that it was bound by the construction of the New
York Act made by the highest court of that state. The dissenters
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Stone argued for overruling Adkins.
Again the warning was made that the Court should not consider
the wisdom of the minimum wage regulation. Chief Justice
Marshall had warned that so long as the end was legitimate, all
legitimate means for the adaptation to that end should be allowed,
and Mr. Justice Cardozo had maintained that once the power
was found in the Constitution, that power must be recognized to
be "as broad as the need that evokes it. ' 58 Thus in his dissent
Mr. Justice Stone admonished that "the legislature must be free
to choose unless government is to be rendered impotent." 59
Following the Tipaldo case, and the election of 1936, pressures
began to build up for measures designed to curb the Court in its
thwarting of New Deal legislation, for if nothing was done, the
Social Security Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and within
the next year the Wages and Hours Act, with its minimum wage
and maximum hour, as well as child labor, provisions, would also
be destined to be invalidated. The old idea of a constitutional
amendment to give Congress the power to override the Court's
decision was revived. An amendment to give the Congress a further
grant of power over all matters of "general economic welfare"
was suggested. But as Professor Corwin asked, "What would be
the point in adding 'new' powers to Congress by constitutional
amendment * * * if these powers were to be exposed to the same
principles of construction that made them necessary?"'6 °
On February 5, 1937, President Roosevelt, having lost patience,
57 See Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 314-15
(1955); Griswold, Owen J. Roberts as a Judge, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 332,
342-43 (1955).
58 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 328 (1936).
59 Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 636 (1936).
60 Corwin, National-State Cooperation-Its Present Possibilities, 8 AM.
LAWS. REV. 687, 688 (1937).
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announced his Court packing-plan, which allowed a Justice to retire
at full pay after he had served ten years on the Court and had
passed the age of seventy; if the Justice did not retire, however,
a new justice could be appointed, until a maximum of fifteen
justices on the Court was reached. Of course this was an invitation
to six of the Justices to retire, leaving only Justices Roberts, Stone
and Cardozo.
Opposition to the plan was immediate. The American Bar
Association organized its forces; even those who were the strongest
supporters of the New Deal felt that President Roosevelt had over-
played his hand; the Chief Justice himself, joined by Mr. Justice
Brandeis, wrote a letter in opposition to the plan to the Senate
Committee which was holding hearings on the plan. In many
respects the opposition was more than justified, for the court plan
was a threat to the independence of the judiciary, bringing pressure
to bear on the Court as to the cases pending before it. The plan
also signified an effort to change the basic structure of the govern-
ment by subordinating the Court to the political branches.
The opposition, however, had hardly a chance to build up be-
fore the Court itself suddenly seemed to reverse itself, and on
March 29, 1937, in a five to four opinion by Chief Justice Hughes,
it handed down the Parrish61 decision overruling Adkins, dis-
tinguishing Tipaldo, and upholding the Washington Minimum
Wage Law for Women. Mr. Justice Roberts was now found firmly
on the side of the majority upholding the law. His shift was de-"
scribed as "a switch in time saves nine." 62
There are those who maintain that Mr. Justice Roberts
"switched" because of the pressure of the 1936 election and the
Court plan.63 Others vehemently deny this, maintaining that such
men as Chief Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice Roberts would not
have accepted and followed the "changed" views had they not
believed them justified under sound principles of constitutional
law.64 They point to Mr. Justice Roberts' position in Nebbia, and
his original intention in Tipaldo, to demonstrate that his vote in
Parrish reflected the natural extension of his previous thinking.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, by documentation, and Dean Griswold
and Mr. Pusey, by careful and independent study of the materials,65
61 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
62 Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR's Court Plan, 61 YALE L. J. 791,
809 (1952).
63 See, e.g., POWELL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 81-82.
64 See, e.g., 2 PUSEY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 757, 771-72.
65 See notes 57 and 64, supra.
U.S. SUPREME COURT: 1930-1941
point out that the decision in Parrish was not prompted by the
Court plan even though handed down on March 29, 1937, a month
and two-thirds after the plan had been proposed: Parrish had been
filed on August 17, 1936, well before the election. The original vote
in Parrish came on December 19, 1936, several months before the
Court plan was proposed. The vote was four to four with Mr.
Justice Stone not participating because of illness. Thus Mr. Justice
Roberts at this point had carried through with his original desire
in Tipaldo to overrule Adkins. The Court then waited until Mr.
Justice Stone returned before handing down the decision in Parrish
by a five to four vote.
A third group considers the change in the Court as both a nat-
ural extension of the prior views and a product of the political pres-
sures on the Court,66 and some ascribe the change to better legis-
lative drafting and other compelling reasons unrelated to the po-
litical pressure.6 7
The changing mood of the Court assured the final defeat of
the President's Court-Packing plan. The defeat symbolized one of
the great victories for our form of constitutional government in pre-
serving the independence of the judiciary, just as the failure of the
attempt to impeach President Andrew Johnson after the Civil War
had been a major victory in preserving the independence of the
Executive.
From May 1937 on, the old Court began to sustain all the New
Deal legislation brought before it. At the end of the October Term,
1936, the personnel of the old Court began to change. Justices Van
Devanter and Sutherland had wanted to resign long before the end
of the term, but because Congress had refused to vote a pension
for Justice Holmes when he retired, the other Justices had been
reluctant to retire and lose their income. During the Court fight,
a retirement bill was finally passed and the Justices began to retire
without fear of losing their income.68 The new Court continued to
sustain New Deal legislation in a long list of cases dealing with key
statutes designed to resuscitate the economy.6 9
66 E.g., CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 72 (1941);
HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT
253 (1951). See also Id. at 236-40, 264-66.
67 See, e.g., ERIKSSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEW DEAL
202-03 (1941); 2 PUSEY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 768.
68 See Id. at 760; CURTIS, op. cit. supra note 33, at 202-04.
69 The following is a list of cases in which New Deal legislation was up-
held. After each citation, there is an indication of the decision of the
Court, the writer for the majority, concurrences, and dissents (by ini-
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Thus the Court returned to the standards laid down by Chief
Justice Marshall, and which had guided it throughout the greater
part of its life. The old theory of the Due Process Clause as a bar
to social legislation was superseded and the Commerce Clause was
expanded or at least returned to the standards propounded by Chief
tial designation indicated in note 22 supra), as well as the particular law
considered:
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (7-1)
(Su) (Mc dissents) (St not participating) (Powers of President over
Foreign Affairs)
Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937)
(8-0) (Hu) (St not participating) (Ashurst-Sumners Act of 1935)
Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445 (1937) (7-0) (Ro) (Br, St not
participating) (National Bankruptcy Act)
United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937) (8-0) (V) (St not partici-
pating) (Silver Purchase Act of 1934)
Wright v. Vinton Branch Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937) (9-0) (Br) (Frazier-
Lemke Act of 1935)
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937) (9-0) (St) (National
Firearms Act of 1934)
Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n 40, Railway Employees, AFL, 300 U.S.
515 (1937) (9-0) (St) (Railway Labor Act of 1926, as amended by the
Act of June 21, 1934)
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1; NLRB v. Fruehauf
Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49; NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co.,
301 U.S. 58 (1937) (5-4) (Hu) (Mc dissents, V, Su, Bu) (National Labor
Relations Act)
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (5-4) (Ro) (Su dissents,
V, Mc, Bu) (National Labor Relations Act)
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937) (5-4)
(St) (Mc dissents) (Su dissents, V, Bu) (Alabama Unemployment Com-
pensation Act)
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (5-4) (C) (Mc dissents)
(Su dissents, V) (Bu dissents) (Social Security Act of 1935)
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (7-2) (C) (Mc, Bu dissent)
(Social Security Act of 1935)
Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453 (1938) (5-2) (Hu)
(Bu dissents, Mc) (C, Re not participating) (National Labor Relations
Act)
United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938) (6-2) (Hu) (Mc, Bu dissent)
(C not participating) (Municipal Bankruptcy Act)
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939) (7-2) (Hu) (Mc, Bu dissent) (To-
bacco Inspection Act of 1935)
Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939) (7-2) (Ro) (Bu dissents, Mc)
(Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938)
Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (8-1) (D) (Mc dis-
sents) (Bituminous Coal Act of 1937)
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (9-0) (St) (Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938)
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (9-0) (J) (Agricultural Ad-
justment Act of 1938)
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Justice Marshall and to the doctrines of Gibbons v. Ogden7 ° and
McCulloch v. Maryland.
71
The Court sought to avoid a Constitutional question when it
could.72 When the Constitutional issue had to be reached the Court
searched for and found the power in the Constitution and left it
to the Congress to "select the means." Only where the legislative
mistake was so clear that it was not open to rational question did
the Court invalidate the statute. Thus, in the economic realm no
statute was to be held invalid, or no decision of an administrative
agency was to be held void, if the Court was able to find some ra-
tional basis for the statute or decisions.
73
Economic planning for resources and labor was recognized as a
power the Constitution allotted to the Congress to be exercised in
accordance with the political processes. The court no longer sought
to impose its will against that of the people; nor did it try to pre-
vent the political branches of the government from providing the
maximum social welfare and economic benefits to the people. The
Court found that under the Constitution Congress had the power to
tax and spend for the nation's welfare and to do all that was neces-
sary and proper to carry the commerce power into execution.
The Due Process Clauses were no longer to be a barrier to legis-
lation protecting unions in their efforts to organize workers and pre-
vent interference with them by employers. The Court showed its
understanding of the principle that the more complex the problem,
the greater the amount of discretion that must be delegated if the
legislative policy is to be effectively administered. Therefore, where
the legislative policy was defined and standards adequately pro-
vided, the Court no longer struck down the delegation of wide
discretion.
70 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
71 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See Stern, supra note 31, at 947. See also
Barnett, Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Self-Restraint, 39
MICH. L. REV. 213 (1940); Hamilton & Braden, The Special Com-
petence of the Supreme Court, 50 YALE, L. J. 1319, 1369-74 (1941);
Powell, Changing Constitutional Phases, 19 B. U. L. REV. 509 (1939);
Stern, The Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due Process, 4
VAND. L. REV. 446 (1951).
72 The violation of this principle had been one of the major factors which
led to the Court crisis. See, e.g., Frankfurter & Hart, The Business of
the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68, 100
(1935); Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at the
October Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HARV. L. REV. 577, 626-37 (1938).
73 See Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 440, 456-58 (1939).
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The Court had overcome an attack upon its independence which
had been so serious a threat that the whole nation had risen up in
the Court's defense to preserve that independence. The disregard
of basic principles of Constitutional law produced an acute crisis,
for the Court and Nation. It created an abrasive in the complex
governmental machinery and interfered with Congress developing a
responsible legislative policy.
The lesson of the New Deal period was that the insistent de-
mands of society for legislation to meet economic collapse cannot be
stayed but temporarily, by the Court. And when the Court passes
upon the wisdom of a legislative enactment rather than on the
power of the legislature to pass that enactment the Court breaks the
dam of decision and the Court itself may be engulfed.
The decisions rendered before 1933 furnished the Court with
ample tools to develop the meaning of the Constitution so as to fa-
cilitate the power of Congress to cope with modern problems. In
fact a large part of the adaptation was accomplished by merely ex-
tending the application of long accepted principles and only in rare
instances were former decisions overruled.
The Court had only to look back to the warnings of Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, Mr. Justice Field, and other earlier luminaries in its
past and to listen to the "great dissenters" in its present, to avoid
most of the pitfalls which overtook it. Grave risks were unneces-
sarily taken in disregarding this counsel which threatened the very
foundations of the governmental structure.
VI. CIVIL LIBERTIES LEGISLATION
It is important to note, however, that during this period of strife
in the life of the Court, when the Court was curtailing economic
freedom, the Court's sensitivity to interference with civil liberties
and political rights was nevertheless heightened. Never has freedom
of speech, of press and of religion been more adequately protected.
The expression of the importance of preserving First Amendment
freedoms for civilization and all democratic processes achieved an
unexcelled profundity. The declaration that "there is no freedom
without choice, and there is no choice without knowledge-or none
that is not illusory" 74 will stir all thoughtful free men. The treasure
at stake was laid bare by Mr. Justice Cardozo when he said: "We
may not squander the thought that will be the inheritance of the
ages."75
74 Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 682, 688 (1931).
75 Ibid.
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During the period from 1925-1940, the First Amendment liber-
ties, as well as certain procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights,
were placed in a "preferred position" vis-a-vis the economic rights
by being gradually incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.76
Just as the Court was to maintain a position of self-restraint
in regard to economic legislation, so the Congress and the state
legislatures were to be held to a position of self-restraint in re-
gard to civil rights and liberties.77 The reason why the Court was
to be usually hesitant in opposing its view against that of the legis-
lature on economic and social policies was that social adjustments
were ephemeral and no authoritative sources for social wisdom ex-
isted. Social development was a process of trial and error, and the
greatest possible opportunity for the free play of the human mind
was to be allowed for the search after truth. The search for truth,
however, was different from economic dogmas, and without free-
:dm'of expression, there could not be any formulation of reasonable
economic legislation. For this reason the Court took the position
that it should have more power to find a legislative invasion in
76 For a discussion on this process of incorporation, see Frankfurter on
Brandeis, supra note 18, at 87-94, 94-98; HENDEL, op. cit. supra note 66,
at 95-96, 116-18, 137-58; MASON ON STONE, op. cit. supra note 25, at
511-31; 2 PUSEY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 717-28. For an early study
of this trend, see Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926). The following is a list of
the major cases in which the trend developed:
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920)
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927)
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937)
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938)
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940);
see Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), rev'd on rehearing, 319 U.S.
103 (1943); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
77 See CURTIS, op. cit. supra note 33, at 264.
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the field of civil liberties than in the area of debatable economic
reform.78
The doctrines which had been given expression by Justices
Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo were accepted by Mr. Justice Stone
and converted into a more precise theory in the famous footnote 4
of the Carolene Products case 7 9 based on the recognition of the
need for the Court to preserve the vital political processes. Mr.
Justice Stone, of course, did agree with Mr. Justice Holmes' for-
mulation of the clear and present danger test. He agreed that the
state should not tolerate opposition which had a real tendency to
aid the external enemy, and he recognized the right of opposition
should not include a toleration for violent opposition. But, he be-
lieved, political activity should not be interfered with unless it
sought to by-pass or threaten the existence of the regular corrective
political processes. If that happened, then the Court as a non-
political agency had to intervene or else the interference with the
normal corrective processes might well perpetuate itself.8 0 Simi-
larly he thought the Court was obligated to protect minorities if
the normal political processes could not be relied upon to protect
them-even where a regulation falls principally upon those outside
the state, for in such a case a legislative action "is not likely to be
subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted
on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the
state.""' The "protection of minorities" aspect of Mr. Justice Stone's
theory has only been given full expression in cases where racial
or religious minorities have been involved. But even here, the pro-
tection has been extended primarily because of the specific consti-
tutional provisions of the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments, and not because of the theory of the safe-
guarding of corrective political processes. As for other minority
groups, such as those outside of a state, there has been little de-
velopment of the theory. The doctrine when limited to racial and
78 See Cardozo, supra, note 74, at 687-88; Frankfurter, supra note 73, at
461-62.
79 United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938).
80 For a discussion of Stone's views, see Braden, The Search for Objec-
tivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L. J. 571, 579-81 (1948); Dowling,
The Methods of Mr. Justice Stone in Constitutional Cases, 41 COLUM.
L. REV. 1160, 1171-79 (1941); Hand, Chief Justice Stone's Conception
of the Judicial Function, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1946); Lusky, Minor-
ity Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 1 (1942), Wechsler,
Stone and the Constitution, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 764 (1946).
81 South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177,
184-85, n.2 (1938).
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religious minorities is supported by the special protection for such
groups provided in the Constitution. If there is an attempt, how-
ever, to extend such a theory to other minorities it is not in ac-
cord with the Constitution which contemplates that their claims
shall be resolved by democratic processes.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter also has accepted as a minimum the
protection of the democratic political processes, but he has con-
structed an "objective or impersonal" doctrine of self-restraint,
tempered and influenced by a respect for the federal system. Thus,
the First Amendment freedoms have been incorporated within
the Fourteenth Amendment because they are specific prohibitions
in the Constitution, and not because of their supposed "preferred
position. ' '8 2 But Mr. Justice Frankfurter has embodied the rest
of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment only on a se-
lective basis of "those which are implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." Such an objective standard is sometimes difficult to
discern for it is not always easy for men to recognize what the
consensus of the community is even when they dwell amongst
those who are busy fashioning it over the years. But Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has been guided in reaching his consensus by the belief
that unless recognized, human liberty or justice would not long
exist. He has known that he who serves the law must appreciate
the forces in society that are molding the law. Above all he has
treated as his axis the knowledge that the life of today is the history
of tomorrow.8 3
Mr. Justice Black has also sought an impersonal standard, but
has rejected the "ordered liberty" concept, preferring to incorpor-
ate the Bill of Rights in toto into the Fourteenth Amendment. His
insistence on going to the precise words of the Constitution itself,
has been in the furtherance of his search for an objective standard
and an abhorrence for any personal, subjective standard. His recog-
nition, however, that it is impossible to be completely literal in this
incorporation implicitly brings in subjective consideratons.8 4
82 See dissent in West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
646-48 (1943); and the concurrence in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
89 (1949).
83 See Braden, supra note 80, at 582-89; Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 62 HARV. L. REV. 357 (1949); Pollack, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter: Judgment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 67
YALE L. J. 304 (1957).
84 See Barnett, Jr., Mr. Justice Black and the Supreme Court, 8 U. CHI. L.
REV. 20 (1940); Braden, supra note 80, at 590-93.
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Thus we are still left with the question as to what precisely is
the power of the Court. Who can exercise the self-restraint, and
have a workable objective standard of judicial review, when such a
standard has to pass necessarily through the minds of men, with all
that life has taught them being carried along as an influence on that
standard? Must we then be compelled to rely on the strengths and
weaknesses of men?
The answer is yes, at least in part. We also have the protection
of the combination of minds on the Court, working together in the
judicial process. However, in the creation of any fundamental or-
.gan of government the choice is always whether to grant a power,
and after that what controls to try to impose on that power. If
the limitations become too extensive the power cannot be used to
accomplish the desired objectives. The secret of avoiding the abuse
of power lies in the selection of men of ability, humility and under-
standing to exercise that power.
